Balancing Judicial Economy, State Opportunism, and Due Process Concerns in the WTO by Frischtak, Ana
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 26 Issue 3 
2005 
Balancing Judicial Economy, State Opportunism, and Due Process 
Concerns in the WTO 
Ana Frischtak 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Trade Law Commons, Organizations Law Commons, and the Transnational 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ana Frischtak, Balancing Judicial Economy, State Opportunism, and Due Process Concerns in the WTO, 
26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 947 (2005). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol26/iss3/5 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
STUDENT NOTE
BALANCING JUDICIAL ECONOMY,
STATE OPPORTUNISM, AND DUE
PROCESS CONCERNS IN THE WTO
Ana Frischtak*
IN TRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 947
I. JUDICIAL ECONOMY, STATE OPPORTUNISM,
AND D UE PROCESS .................................................................... 949
I. BRINGING A CLAIM: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE
WORKINGS OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE .......... 953
A . Consultations ..................................................................... 953
B. Request for Establishment of a Panel ................................ 959
Il. SCENARIOS AND IMPLICATIONS ................................................ 964
A. Measures Withdrawn During the Course
of Proceedings ................................................................... 964
B. Measure is Withdrawn but New Measure Enacted
Raises Sim ilar Issues .......................................................... 968
C. Measure Remains in Effect but its Provisions Are
no Longer Applied to the Complaining Member ............... 972
D. Amendments to Measures During the Course
of P roceedings ................................................................... 973
E. Measures that Expired Before the Request
for Consultations ............................................................... 977
F. Measures Not Included in Requests for Consultations
and/or Requests for the Establishment of the Panel .......... 979
G. Measures not yet Enacted at the Time of the Request
for the Establishment of the Panel ..................................... 981
IV. ADVISORY JURISDICTION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM .......... 983
C ONCLU SION .......................................................................................... 989
INTRODUCTION
The dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) completed ten years of operation this past January. As arguably
the most prolific of all international dispute settlement systems, and one
of the few with any real "teeth" vis-A-vis both rich and poor countries,
the efficient, fair, and transparent functioning of this system is essential
* J.D., University of Michigan Law School, expected May 2006; B.A. in Govern-
ment, Magna Cum Laude, Cornell University. I am very grateful to Prof. Robert Howse for his
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to the future of world trade.' Since January 1995, 302 disputes have been
brought to the WTO system for resolution. This is a greater number of
cases then was brought to the WTO's predecessor (the GATT) between
1948 and 1995.' More importantly, developing countries have been ma-
jor users of the system. In 1995, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 developing
country Members brought a greater number of disputes to the WTO as
compared to developed country Members In particular, in 39 percent of
all disputes, developing country Members were complainants.6 Small
developing country Members have brought, and won, cases against large
developed country Members. An excellent example of this is the US-
Underwear dispute, where Costa Rica was the complainant against the
United States.'
Despite the relative success of the dispute settlement system for both
developed and developing countries alike, there is still plenty of room
for improvement. This fact was officially recognized by WTO Members
in November 2001 at the Doha Ministerial Conference where formal
negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding,' an Annex to the
WTO Agreement which establishes the obligations and purposes of the
dispute settlement body, were opened. 9 The negotiations were to begin in
January 2002. '0 These negotiations are still underway and Member coun-
tries have submitted proposals that touch upon almost all aspects of the
dispute settlement system, including: those relating to its institutions; its
proceedings; and to systemic issues such as transparency concerns, the
amicus curiae brief issue, and special and differential rights for develop-
ing country Members."
1. Peter Van den Bossche, The Doha Development Round Negotiations on the DSU,





6. Id. at 8-9.
7. See Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made
Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/ R, adopted Nov. 8, 1996.
8. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 33, 33
I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
9. Doha Round Ministerial Declaration, 20 November 2001, WT/MIN(0l)/DEC/1 at
para. 30 (2001).
10. Van den Bossche, supra note 1, at 14.
11. Id. at 14-16. See also Dispute Settlement Body Special Session, Contribution of the
European Communities and Its Member States to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute Set-
tlement System, TN/DS/W/1 (Mar. 13 2002) [hereinafter European Proposal] (proposing more
permanent panelists, addressing sequencing and the need for greater transparency, procedures
to regulate the submission of amicus curiae submissions, and more general improvements);
Dispute Settlement Body Special Session, Text for the African Group on DSU Negotiations,
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This Note will focus on an aspect of the dispute settlement proceed-
ing that has not been officially proposed for reform: the withdrawal of
and amendments to measures being challenged by a complaining Mem-
ber during the course of the proceedings."2 This aspect raises issues of
judicial economy, state opportunism, and due process. In particular, this
practice, where the respondent country to a dispute withdraws or amends
the measure being challenged during the course of proceedings, threat-
ens to undermine the legitimacy of the dispute settlement system as a
fair and transparent adjudicating body.
The first section of this Note will briefly describe how issues of ju-
dicial economy, state opportunism, and due process relate to the
withdrawal of and amendment to contested measures in the dispute set-
tlement proceedings. The second section will describe the main steps
involved in bringing a claim in the WTO. This discussion provides im-
portant background information for the third section, which will describe
and analyze the various situations that have arisen in WTO case law con-
cerning withdrawn and amended measures and how the panels and
Appellate Body have responded. Finally, the conclusion will reflect upon
the responses of the panels and Appellate Body with regard to the vari-
ous concerns expressed above and the possibilities for dispute settlement
reform in this context, in particular, the issuance of advisory opinions by
the Appellate Body.
I. JUDICIAL ECONOMY, STATE OPPORTUNISM, 'AND DUE PROCESS
Judicial economy is a concern for both domestic and international
courts. Given the expense of undertaking litigation, particularly long
TN/DS/W/42 (Jan. 24, 2003) (proposing eleven specific areas for amendment including meas-
ures withdrawn before or during consultations, rights of third parties, and compensation).
12. It might also be the case that this issue has not even been proposed unofficially,
however this is difficult to verify with any certainty.
13. Domestic courts often raise judicial economy concerns. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) ("Because we find the forum selection clause to
be dispositive of this question, we need not consider petitioner's constitutional argument.").
With regard to international courts, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has considered
judicial economy issues in whether to issue an advisory opinion pursuant to Article 65 of the
ICJ Statute. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 53 (Jul.
8) (Oda, J., dissenting):
[Tihe Request should have been dismissed in the present case, on account of con-
siderations of judicial economy .... If the flood-gates were thus opened for any
legal question of a general nature which would not require immediate solution, in
circumstances where there was no practical dispute or need, then the Court could
receive many cases of an academic or intellectual nature with the consequence that
it would be the less able to exercise its real function as a judicial institution.
Spring 2005]
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and complex litigation, avoiding unnecessary costs is a common con-
cern. 4 The main way courts exercise judicial economy is by refraining
from issuing decisions on matters that either cannot be adjudicated or no
longer need to be adjudicated. Such a situation may arise for a number of
reasons. For example, an issue may be moot, a party (or the parties) may
lack standing, the same or a different court may have previously adjudi-
cated the dispute (res judicata), or the concerned parties may have come
to a settlement.
5
In the WTO dispute settlement system, unlike domestic courts where
parties may go to trial to receive damages and not merely for an injunc-
tion, the final remedy for breach of a provision of the WTO Agreement
is the withdrawal or amendment of the offending measure. 6 Once a
measure has been withdrawn or amended, the complaining Member is
rarely entitled to anything else, such as money damages for example."
Accordingly, in cases where WTO Members decide to withdraw or
amend contested measures during the course of proceedings, judicial
economy concerns alone would generally support the termination of the
adjudication as the measure affecting the complaining Member would no
longer be in effect.
Id. In addition, judicial economy concerns are also acknowledged in the DSU. DSU, supra
note 8, art. 3.7 ("Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgment as to whether
action under these procedures would be fruitful.").
14. Cost is an issue not only for the parties but also for the courts. In addition, it is
important to note that cost is not the only reason courts decide to exercise judicial economy.
For example, a court may decide not to exercise its jurisdiction for reasons of comity with
regard to either a foreign state or a different political division within its own country.
15. In WTO case law, settlement is encouraged through the
consultation process. For example the DSU states:
If a request for consultations is made pursuant to a covered agreement, the Member
to which the request is made shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, reply to the
request within 10 days after the date of its receipt and shall enter into consultations
in good faith within a period of no more than 30 days after the date of receipt of the
request, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution.
DSU, supra note 8, art. 4.3 (emphasis added).
16. The DSU states:
In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute set-
tlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if
these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agree-
ments. The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate
withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the
withdrawal of the measure which is inconsistent with a covered agreement.
Id. art. 3.7.
17. In some instances, compensation and suspension of trade concessions are granted to
the injured State (not the private parties who might also have been injured). However, these
are only granted as countermeasures in circumstances where the losing party has failed to
implement the specific remedy. See id. art. 22.
[Vol. 26:947
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State opportunism is also a concern in the WTO dispute settlement
system." As discussed above, once the WTO-inconsistent measure is
withdrawn or amended, there are no remaining issues between the par-
ties that would justify the continuance of the adjudication.' 9
Consequently, Member countries could conveniently amend or withdraw
measures immediately before a dispute is brought before a panel, even if
they intended to enact it again once the panel was dissolved. A country
would be able to do this without violating its WTO obligations if the
panel had in fact terminated the adjudication without making a decision
regarding the measure. While the responding Member may also incur
some costs during this process (depending upon the point at which it
decides to withdraw the measure) it may be willing to do so if the politi-
cal costs of permanently withdrawing the contested measure were too
high. Alternatively, and even more likely, rather than withdrawing the
measure and then reenacting the same measure at a later time, Members
might instead enact a new measure with the same effect of the with-
drawn measure.20
The panels and the Appellate Body can be very formalistic with
regards to the interpretation of the "measures at issue" in the dispute.2' A
focus on the label of a measure by itself, without attention to its
implementation or effect, can make panels and the Appellate Body even
18. Both panels and the Appellate Body have expressed such a concern. For example,
in Appellate Body Report, Chile-Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to
Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R, adopted Sept. 23, 2002, paragraph 144
[hereinafter Appellate Body Chile-Price Band], the Appellate Body stated: "[w]e emphasize
that we do not mean to condone a practice of amending measures during dispute settlement
proceedings if such changes are made with a view to shielding a measure from scrutiny by a
panel or by us'"
19. See DSU, supra note 8, art. 4.3.
20. See, e.g., Panel Report, Argentina-Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Tex-
tiles, Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS56/R, adopted Nov. 25, 1997 [hereinafter Argentina-
Footwear and Textiles] (where Argentina withdrew a measure being challenged by a com-
plaining Member only to subsequently enact a technically distinct measure whose effects to
the former one were identical).
21. See, e.g., SOL PICCIOTTO, THE VVTO's APPELLATE BODY: LEGAL FORMALISM AS A
LEGITIMATION OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 13 (School of Public Policy Working Paper Series:
ISSN 1479-9472, Working Paper 14, 2005):
[The Appellate Body] has stressed a literal approach to interpretation. Basing itself
on the rules of treaty interpretation in international law, it has emphasized that 'the
words of the treaty form the foundation of the interpretative process' .... Empha-
sizing the importance of the words of the texts, it has frequently corrected the
reasoning in Panel reports, although rarely altering outcomes. This approach can be
regard as formalist, in that it adopts an essentialist view of the meaning of the
words, and assumes that the law is a closed and self-referential system of rules.
Spring 2005]
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22more vulnerable to state opportunism. This, however, does not need to
be the case. According to Article 13 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), each panel has the right to seek information and
technical advice from any individual or body.23 In addition, panels may
seek information from any relevant source.24 Therefore, panels and the
Appellate Body should take advantage of the flexibility provided in the
DSU to ensure a fair and reasonable outcome to a dispute and not one
merely based on overly literal readings or on mere technicalities. 5
Due process concerns the rights of the parties to a dispute vis-A-vis
the procedures of the court or adjudicating body. 26 Each party is entitled
to a fair and transparent adjudication in accordance with the rules of the
particular court or tribunal adjudicating the dispute.27 Due process gener-
ally implicates, for example, the right of a party to be given reasonable
notice of a claim against it and the right to prepare and present evidence
in its defense.28
One specific application of this concept in the WTO context con-
cerns mid-dispute amendments. When a measure is amended in the
middle of the proceedings and a panel allows the amended measure to
constitute part of its jurisdiction, the complaining Member may be at a
disadvantage.29 Up until the time of the amendment, the complaining
Member would have concentrated its know-how and resources on a par-
ticular measure which, as a result, may no longer be in dispute.0
22. See Argentina-Footwear and Textiles, supra note 20, at para. 2.8 and 6.5.
23. DSU, supra note 8, art. 13.1.
24. Id. art 13.2.
25. See PICCIOTO, supra note 21, at 16, where the author argues that the Appellate
Body's formalism is a result of the need to uphold its legitimacy, not as a global government,
but merely to uphold global rules. In addition, he argues that "[t]he AB's caution is also due to
its uncertainty about its accountability, expressed as a concern to avoid accusations that it has
exceeded its mandate through judicial activism." Id.
26. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § .; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
27. International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. 310, 316 ("due process requires only that ... the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice."' (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
28. Milliken, 311 U.S. 457, 463.
29. Panels have given consideration to such concerns. See, e.g., Panel Report, Chile-
Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products,
WT/DS207/R, adopted May 3, 2002, at para. 7.120, [hereinafter Chile-Price Band], modified,
Appellate Body Chile-Price Band, supra note 17.
30. See Panel Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R, adopted Oct. 30, 2000, para. 6.17 [herein-
after EC-Bed Linen] (concluding that a Member must prove that it suffered some kind of
unfairness in this regard in order to exclude from its jurisdiction a treaty provision not listed in
the request for establishment of the panel). This makes it clear that the Panel was aware of the
potential for unfairness to the respondent as a result of allowing an amended measure to be-
come part of its jurisdiction.
[Vol. 26:947
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Furthermore, the complaining Member may not have the capacity to "re-
group" in sufficient time to successfully litigate the dispute. Accordingly,
the amendment or enactment of similar measures during the proceedings
can produce significant due process concerns for the responding party if
the WTO adjudicator fails to give full consideration to the new situation
at hand.31
II. BRINGING A CLAIM: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE WORKINGS
OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE
In order to better understand the various cases and implications dis-
cussed in the course of this Note, I will begin with a brief explanation of
the main procedures Members must follow in order to successfully bring
a dispute before a panel.
A. Consultations
The first step to adjudicating a claim before a WTO panel is for the2
complaining Member to bring a formal request for consultations. The
purpose of the consultations is to enable the parties to gather relevant
and correct information so that they can reach a mutually agreed solu-
tion, or in the case that the parties are not able to agree, so that they can
present accurate information to the panel.33 Through consultations, par-
ties exchange information, assess the merits of their positions, and work
to narrow contested issues.34
Requests for consultations should be in writing and a copy should be
provided to the dispute settlement body (DSB) in addition to the relevant
WTO councils and committees in each case.35 The DSB was created
during the Uruguay Round to deal with disputes arising among WTO
31. Panels have given consideration to this issue in a number of cases. See, e.g., Panel
Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, adopted Sept. 8, 2004
[hereinafter US-Cotton Subsidies]; Chile-Price Band, supra note 29; Panel Report, Brazil-
Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/R, adopted Apr. 14, 1999, [hereinafter
Brazil-Aircraft], modified, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted Aug. 2, 1999
[hereinafter Appellate Body Brazil-Aircraft].
32. DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 86 (2004).
33. Id. at 87, citing Panel Report, Korea- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/R,
WT/DS84/R, adopted Sept. 17, 1998, para. 10.23 [hereinafter Korea-Alcoholic Beverages],
modified, Appellate Body Report, Korea- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R,
WT/DS84/AB/R adopted Jan. 18, 1999.
34. Id. at 89, citing Appellate Body Mexico-Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fruc-
tose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the
United States, WT/DS132/AB/RW, adopted Oct. 22, 2001 [hereinafter Mexico-Corn Syrup].
35. Id. at 87.
Spring 20051
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Member States (under the WTO Agreements) and in accordance with the
provisions of the DSU.36 The DSB is composed of representatives of all
WTO Members37 and "consensus" is the process by which its decisions
are taken.38 It has the authority to, among other things, establish panels
and to adopt panel and Appellate Body reports.39
A Member State's request for consultations should specify the rele-
vant WTO agreements and the particular articles under which
consultations are sought.4° Article 4.4 of the DSU requires that a com-
plaining party "give the reasons for the request, including identification
of the measures at issue and an indication of the legal basis for the com-
plaint."4  Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that the request for the
establishment of a panel indicate whether consultations have been held
and identify the specific measures at issue.4'2 The relationship between
Article 4.4 and 6.2 is not entirely clear. While on the one hand it seems
that there is an obvious and necessary connection between these two re-
quirements, it is not clear to what extent the two requests need to be
identical.43
This debate is important from a jurisdictional perspective, and for
the purposes of this Note, because it helps explain how the panels and
the Appellate Body derive their terms of reference and the extent to
which WTO adjudicators will consider new claims."M There is an impor-
tant parallel between WTO adjudicators' initial analysis of what
measures are to be included in its jurisdiction at the time of the request
36. Id. at 15.
37. Id.
38. Id. Consensus occurs when no Member present at the DSB meeting formally ob-
jects to any decision being made.
39. See Id.
40. Id. at 87.
41. DSU, supra note 8, art. 4.4.
42.
The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indi-
cate whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and
provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the
problem clearly. In case the applicant requests the establishment of a panel with
other than standard terms of reference, the written request shall include the pro-
posed text of special terms of reference.
Id. art. 6.2.
43. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 87-88.
44. This question first arose in US-DRAMS when the United States claimed that it
should be able to refer a claim to a panel if it was actually raised during consultations despite
the fact that it had not been included in the written request for consultations. However, no
response to this question was ever reached by the Panel since it was able to make a ruling
without reaching this issue. Panel Report, United States-Anti-Dumping on Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea,
WT/DS99/R, adopted Mar. 19, 1999, para. 6.8 [hereinafter US-DRAMS].
[Vol. 26:947
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for the establishment of the panel (in cases where these measures were
not raised in the consultations) and their subsequent analysis, the subject
of this Note, regarding what measures are to constitute part of its juris-
diction during the course of proceedings (when measures are amended or
withdrawn). The adjudicators' initial analysis usually relates to those
measures not included in consultations but included in the request for the
panel, while the latter analysis usually encompasses those measures that
were part of the consultations but arguably no longer part of the panel's
terms of reference since they were either amended or withdrawn.
For example, in deciding whether and on what basis to exclude or
include particular measures within its jurisdiction (i.e. terms of refer-
ence), the panels and the Appellate Body must deal with issues of due
process in both their initial and subsequent analyses. In their analysis
noting the strictness with which the Appellate Body interpreted the re-
quirements of DSU Art. 6.2, Horlick and Butterton state: "[t]he
Appellate Body's desire to impose a hard procedural constraint by nar-
rowly interpreting the requirements of article 6.2 is not surprising;
rudimentary considerations of due process will seem to most lawyers,
not to mention diplomats, to demand as much."4 5 It is this precise issue-
whether WTO adjudicators should allow withdrawn or amended meas-
ures to remain or become part of its jurisdiction in light of concerns such
as due process-that is analyzed, along with others, in this Note.
The following cases illustrate how the panels and Appellate Body
have dealt with this initial analysis to date. In Japan-Agricultural Prod-
ucts II, the requests for consultations used the phrase "including, but are
not limited to" Articles 2, 4, 5 and 8, yet the Panel accepted the subse-
quent inclusion of Article 7 in the request for the establishment of the
panel, even though the article was not listed in the consultation request
(presumably, the language "not limited to" was sufficient in that case).46
A slightly different question was posed in Brazil-Aircraft.47 Unlike
the cases above, where consultations were in fact held about the subject
matter but where the measure was simply not formally included in the
request for consultations, here there were simply no consultations about
45. Gary N. Horlick & Glenn R. Butterton 6 A Problem of Process in WTO
Jurisprudence: Identifying Disputed Issues in Panels and Consultations, at http://
www.law.georgetown.edu/joumalslpib/symp0O/documents/horlick.pdf.
46. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 88, citing Panel Report, Japan-
Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/R, adopted Mar. 19, 1999, para. 8.4,
modified, Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products,
WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted 22 February 1999. See India-Patent Protection For Pharmaceutical
and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted Dec. 19, 1997, para. 90 [here-
inafter Appellate Body India-Patents].
47. Brazil-Aircraft, supra note 31, at para. 7.8.
Spring 2005]
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the specific measures. 48 The Panel held that the measure at issue that was
neither included in the request for consultations nor in the actual discus-
sions but included in the request for the panel was deemed to be within
the Panel's jurisdiction. The Appellate Body, in affirming the Panel's
decision, stated:
We do not believe ... that Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, or para-
graphs 1 to 4 of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, require a
precise and exact identity between the specific measures that
were the subject of consultations and the specific measures iden-
tified in the request for the establishment of a panel.49
From such a holding one may be tempted to conclude that measures not
included in the consultations (either in the request itself or the actual
discussions) yet included in the request for the panel would be within a
panel's jurisdiction. It may be the case, however, that such a holding is
particular to Brazil-Aircraft. There, both the Panel and Appellate Body
concluded that the measures in question were mere subsequent regula-
tory measures dealing with the same underlying subsidies which had
been identified in the consultation request and which were the actual
subject of the consultations. 0 The Panel stated: "[w]e consider that the
consultations and request for establishment relate to what is fundamen-
tally the same 'dispute', because they involve essentially the same
practice, i.e., the payment of export subsidies under PROEX [the gov-
ernment program for the financing of aircraft for export]."" In other
words, the Panel never dispensed with the requirement that there be a
relationship between Article 4.4 and 6.2 in substance since the measures
at issue were in substance the same as those that had been included in
the request for consultations and discussed at that time. It did dispense
with the relationship requirement on technical terms, however (since
technically, the new measures were not included in the request or during
the consultations themselves yet the adjudicators decided to consider
them to be part of their jurisdiction anyway).
The requirement that the request for establishment of the panel be
strictly limited to the matters explicitly set forth in the request for con-
sultations should not be strictly enforced by WTO adjudicators 2 First,
48. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 89.
49. Appellate Body Brazil-Aircraft, supra note 31, at para. 132.
50. Id. at para. 196.
51. Brazil-Aircraft, supra note 31, at para. 7.11.
52. Support for this view can be found in DSU, supra note 8, articles 4.3 and 6.2, and
in Mexico-Corn Syrup, supra note 34, at paragraph 63.
The recently released US-Cotton Subsidies Appellate Body report bears on this point as
well:
[Vol. 26:947
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Article 4.3 of the DSU allows Members to request a panel if the respon-
dent Member does not respond to the request for consultations or does
not enter into consultations within a certain timeframe 3 This suggests
that adjudication can go forward without consultations. The DSB has not
found the prejudice to parties' rights from a lack of consultations to be
harmful enough to justify impeding the litigation. This point was empha-
sized in Mexico-Corn Syrup where the Appellate Body noted that "the
DSU has explicitly recognized circumstances where the absence of the
consultations would not deprive the panel of its authority to consider the
matter referred to it by the DSB.' 54 In addition, the notion that consulta-
tions are not necessary for the establishment of the panel is also
acknowledged in Article 6.2 DSU, which states that the request for the
establishment of the panel shall indicate whether consultations were
held.5 Accordingly, Article 6.2 may be satisfied "by an express statement
that no consultations were held" and therefore it "envisages the possibil-
ity that a panel may be validly established without being preceded by
consultations.
56
Second, the DSU does not recognize the concept of "adequacy of
consultations."57 As explained above, the DSB has the authority to estab-
lish panels and, in doing so, the adequacy of consultations is a matter
that can be addressed in its meeting before the panel is established. In
other words, a panel is not in a position to know what was actually dis-
cussed during the consultations, and therefore should not attempt to
resolve the dispute between the parties at that time. What takes place in
the consultations is "not the concern to the panel."" Accordingly, it is
odd to rely so heavily on this step in framing the panel's jurisdiction. In
addition, through Article 4.6 of the DSU, which states that consultations
are confidential and without prejudice to the rights of a Member in any
As long as the complaining party does not expand the scope of the dispute, we hesi-
tate to impose too rigid a standard for the "precise and exact identity" between the
scope of consultations and the request for the establishment of the panel, as this
would substitute the request for consultations for the panel request.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R,
adopted Mar. 3, 2005, para. 293 [hereinafter Appellate Body US-Cotton Subsidies] quoting
Brazil-Aircraft, supra note 31, at para. 132 (emphasis omitted)(footnote omitted).
53. DSU, supra note 8, art. 4.3.
54. Mexico-Corn Syrup, supra note 34, at para. 63 (emphasis omitted).
55. DSU, supra note 8, art. 6.2.
56. Mexico-Corn Syrup, supra note 34, at para. 62 (emphasis omitted).
57. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 90, citing Korea-Alcoholic Beverages,
supra note 33, at para. 10.19.
58. Id.
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further proceedings, 9 the DSB explicitly diminishes the value of consul-
tations to the overall panel process as the substance of the consultations
cannot be referred to during the subsequent adjudication.
Finally, the DSU operates in similar fashion to a civil law court
where the judge takes on a much more involved role in the settling of the
dispute at the expense of what the common law systems call the "adver-
sarial" nature of civil procedure.6° While the proceedings are still
adversarial, this characterization of the adjudicator's involvement sug-
gests that the consultations themselves, where the adjudicator has no role
(as the consultations are confidential between the parties to the dispute
only), 61 are thus quite separate from the panel's proceedings. Accord-
ingly, the request for the panel should be the main focus of the
jurisdiction of the panel. The consultations and their requests, on the
other hand, should be a separate aspect of the proceedings; their main
focus should be on achieving a settlement between the parties in order to
eliminate the need to resort to litigation. 6 The substance of the requests
for consultations and consultations themselves should not strictly deter-
mine the nature of the subsequent dispute. Given the centrality of the
panel request for determining the jurisdiction of the panel, 63 as will be
seen below, the need to require such inter-relatedness between the re-
quest for consultations and the request for the establishment of the panel
is not clear.
Both the panels and the Appellate Body, however, have emphasized
the importance of the inter-relatedness between the request for consulta-
tions, the consultations themselves, and the requests for the
establishment of the panel. 64 In particular, the Appellate Body has under-
scored the importance of consultations in shaping the substance of the
59. DSU, supra note 8, art. 4.6. Thus, for example, a Member's offer for compromise
would not constitute an admission that a particular measure is inconsistent with its WTO obli-
gations.
60. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 116 (discussing the panel's right to
seek evidence on its own initiative). See also DSU, supra note 8, art. 13. With regard to the
adversarial nature of civil procedure,
The central feature of [the adversarial system] is the almost total responsibility
placed on the parties to the controversy for beginning suit, for shaping issues, and
for producing evidence; the court almost takes no active part in these facets of the
process .... By contrast, the judicial system in civil law countries employ the in-
quisitorial system. Under the inquisitorial model, the court conducts an active and
independent inquiry into the merits of each case ....
COUND, JOHN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE at 2 (8th ed., 2001) (emphasis omitted).
61. See DSU, supra note 8, art. 4.6 ("Consultations shall be confidential, and without
prejudice to the rights of any Member in any further proceedings.").
62. See id. at art. 3.7 and 4.2.
63. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 94.
64. See, e.g., Appellate Body India-Patents, supra note 46, at para. 87 and para. 94.
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panel proceedings, emphasizing that the demands of due process implicit
in the DSU make full disclosure of facts during consultations especially
important. "IT]he claims that are made and the facts that are established
during consultations do much to shape the substance and scope of sub-
sequent panel proceedings."65
This, however, is not dispositive: the Appellate Body's view does not
necessarily negate the claim that the request for the establishment of the
panel should not be strictly limited to the matters explicitly set forth in
the request for consultations. Indeed, the very fact that consultations can
shape the panel proceedings should be reason to allow a more flexible
approach to the requests for the establishment of the panel, which should
be influenced by, and not circumscribed by, the previous consultations.
66
B. Request for Establishment of a Panel
The complaining Member's request for the establishment of a panel
plays an important role in determining the subject matter jurisdiction of
the panel as it is incorporated into its terms of reference.67 In addition,
the request for establishment of a panel fulfills the due process objective
of placing the responding party and any potential third parties on notice
regarding the claims at issue.
The formal requirements of a request for the establishment of a
panel are set out in Article 6.2 of the DSU: a request must be in writing;
it must indicate whether consultations were held; it must identify a spe-
cific measure at issue; and it must provide a brief legal basis for the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.69 The "measure at
issue" refers to a law or regulation, or an action that applies to a law or
regulation which is the subject of the dispute.70 The "legal basis for the
complaint" or the "claim" together with the "measure at issue" constitute
the "matter" before the panel, which is referred to in the standard terms
of reference set out in Article 7.1 of the DSU.
71
The extent of a panel's jurisdiction is dependent upon both the sub-
ject matter of the dispute and the parties to the dispute.72 In particular, the
65. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 91 (quoting Appellate Body India-
Patents, supra note 46, at para. 94).
66. Support for this view can be found in the DSU, Articles 4.3 and 6.2, DSU, supra
note 8, and the Mexico-Corn Syrup case, supra note 34, at para. 63.
67. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 94.
68. Id.
69. DSU, supra note 8, art. 6.2.
70. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 97.
71. Id. at 97, citing Appellate Body Report, Guatemala-Anti-Dumping Investigation
Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted Nov. 25, 1998, para. 75.
72. Id. at 17.
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request for the establishment of the panel determines its jurisdiction.73
Any dispute as to what should or should not be included in the panel's
jurisdiction is ultimately decided by a WTO adjudicator and not the
DSB; the latter only decides whether the panel should be established in
the first place. 74 In India-Patents, the Appellate Body stated that "a
panel has the discretion to determine the claims it must address in order
to resolve the dispute between the parties-provided that those claims
are within that panel's terms of reference. 75 In addition, the Appellate
Body stated:
A panel's terms of reference are important for two reasons. First,
terms of reference fulfill an important due process objective-
they give the parties and third parties sufficient information con-
cerning the claims at issue in the dispute in order to allow them
an opportunity to respond to the complainant's case. Second,
they establish the jurisdiction of the panel by defining the pre-
cise claims at issue in the dispute.76
WTO jurisprudence has addressed the question of the required level
of specificity in a panel request for adequate identification of both the
measure and the claim at issue. This specificity analysis provides critical
insight into the issues surrounding jurisdiction and withdrawn or
amended measures that will be explored in the next section of this Note.
For example, in Japan-Film, Japan argued that eight measures listed in
the panel request were inadmissible as they were only mentioned for the
first time in the United States' first written submission to the Panel.7 The
Panel disagreed, stating that Article 6.2 requirements are met when a
measure is a subsidiary of or so closely related to another measure spe-
cifically identified so that the responding party can reasonably have had
adequate notice of the claims asserted by the complaining party.78 There
are limits to this finding, however. In Indonesia-Autos for example, the
Panel ruled that a loan, not identified in the panel request, was not within
73. Id.
74. Id. at 108.
75. Appellate Body India-Patents, supra note 46, at para. 87.
76. Id., quoting Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coco-
nut, WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted Feb. 21, 1997, at 22 [hereinafter Appellate Body Brazil-
Coconut].
77. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 97, citing Panel Report, Japan-
Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R and Corr. 1, adopted
Feb. 19, 2002, para. 10.2 [hereinafter Japan-Film].
78. Id. at 98 (citing Japan-Film, supra note 77, at para. 10.8).
[Vol. 26:947
Due Process in the WTO
its terms of reference, despite the fact that it was one aspect of the larger
program which was at issue before the Panel.79
Regarding the claim or legal basis of the complaint, the Appellate
Body has stated that the phrase "including but not limited to" is not suf-
ficient to meet the complainant's burden to identify the specific measures
at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint
to present the problem clearly, as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU.80 In
addition, while it is necessary for the panel request to identify the provi-
sions that constitute the basis of the Member's claims, simply listing the
provisions may not be sufficient." This must be determined on a case-
by-case basis, however, taking "into account whether the ability of the
respondent to defend itself was prejudiced, given the actual course of the
panel proceedings, by the fact that the panel request simply listed provi-
sions claimed to have been violated. ' 2
Interestingly, in EC-Bed Linen, when faced with a failure in the re-
quest for a panel to list a specific treaty article alleged to have been
violated, the Panel held that claims based on that article were outside its
terms of reference, even if the omission was inadvertent.83 It made no
difference to the Panel that the article had been listed in the request for
consultations, discussed in consultations, and covered in the complaining
party's first written submission.4 The Panel argued that a "failure to state
a claim in even the most minimal sense, by listing the treaty Articles al-
leged to be violated, cannot be cured by reference to subsequent
submissions."85 This harsh brightline standard, however, is relaxed if
there is no evidence of prejudice to complaining or third parties by the
simple listing of an article. Then the request that the claim be dismissed
for lack of specificity will be denied; still, questions regarding which
79. Id. at 98 (citing Panel Report, Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automo-
bile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R and Corr.l, 2, 3, and 4, adopted Dec.
19, 2002, para. 14.3 [hereinafter Indonesia-Autos]).
80. E.g., Appellate Body India-Patents, supra note 46, at para. 90.
81. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 99, citing Appellate Body Report, Ko-
rea-Definitive Safeguards Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R,
adopted Jan. 12, 2000, para. 124 [hereinafter Appellate Body Korea-Dairy].
82. Id. at 99 (quoting Appellate Body Korea-Dairy, supra note 81, at para. 127).
83. Id. at 101 (citing EC-Bed Linen, supra note 30, at para. 6.17). This is an interesting
result, particularly compared with particular instances in American law, such as cases involv-
ing contracts, where courts do not usually allow parties to profit from an adverse party's
clerical mistakes. See, e.g., Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713,
717 (Cal. 1960).
84. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 101 (citing EC-Bed Linen, supra note
30, at paras. 6.14, 6.15).
85. Id. (quoting EC-Bed Linen, supra note 30, at para. 6.15).
Spring 2005]
Michigan Journal of International Law
party has the burden of proof to show or disprove prejudice in such situa-
tions are unclear.8 6
While the general rule is that a party asserting a particular claim car-
ries the burden of proof,87 a party invoking an exception to justify action
that would otherwise be inconsistent with its WTO obligations shifts the
burden on to itself.8" The question therefore becomes whether proving or
disproving prejudice in these cases (where the adjudicator has ruled that
the complaining party's request is not sufficient) should be viewed as a
general rule or an exception. There is room to argue that it is an excep-
tion because it is the complaining party that has not complied correctly
with DSU procedures yet still wants to maintain its claim. In such cases,
it would be unfair, as well as a waste of scarce judicial resources, to ask
the responding party to prove prejudice in the face of the possibility that
the claim itself may not stand.
Despite this suggestion, however, the Panel in United States-Shrimp
broadly interpreted the terms of reference and placed the burden of proof
on the responding party.9 In that case, the complainant Malaysia argued
that the Panel, in the Article 21.5 proceedings, was not limited to consid-
ering whether or not the United States had complied with the DSB
recommendations and to rulings which had been based on the original
terms of reference.90 Instead, it argued that the mandate of the Panel un-
der Article 21.5 was to examine the existence or the consistency of the
measures the United States had taken with Articles XI and XX of the
GATT 1994. 9' The United States in turn argued that the issue in the pro-
ceeding was more limited-it was merely to determine whether it had
complied with the rulings and recommendations of the DSB by modify-
ing the application of the law in question.92
86. Id. (citing EC-Bed Linen, supra note 30, at para. 6.29). This is certainly a potential
safeguard and advantage to countries with less resources, less skilled individuals and less
experience in bringing claims.
87. Id. at 143.
88. Id. at 148.
89. Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibitions of Shrimp and Shrimp Products-
Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WT/DS58/RW, adopted June, 15 2001 [hereinafter
United States-Shrimp], paras. 3.4 and 5.9.
90. Id. at para. 3.1. Additionally, DSU article 21.5 reads, in part: "[wihere there is dis-
agreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to
comply with the recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse
to these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the original
panel." DSU, supra note 8, art. 21.5. Therefore, recourse to this article is invoked when a
Member country is unsatisfied with the compliance of another Member country with the rec-
ommendations given by the panel or Appellate Body (and ultimately by the DSB) in an earlier
dispute.
91. United States-Shrimp, supra note 89, at para. 3.2.
92. Id. at para. 3.4.
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In other words, Malaysia argued in favor of expanding the jurisdic-
tion of the panel by asking it to review the United States' action in
relation to the GATT articles above, in addition to the rulings and rec-
ommendations of the DSB. In holding that it was fully entitled to
address all Malaysia's claims under the above GATT articles, the Panel
noted that the United States did not argue that Malaysia's claims were
insufficiently specific or that its request for the establishment of an Arti-
cle 21.5 panel otherwise failed to meet the requirements of Article 6.2 of
the DSU.93 Citing the Appellate Body's decision in Canada-Aircrafts
(21.5), it stated:
[A] panel [under Article 21.5] is not confined to examining the
measures taken to comply from the perspective of the claims,
arguments and factual circumstances that related to the measure
that was subject to the original proceedings. [ ... ] Article 21.5
proceedings involve, in principle, not the original measure, but
rather a new and different measure which was not before the
original panel. [...] It is natural, therefore, that the claims, ar-
guments and factual circumstances which are pertinent to the
"measures to comply" will not, necessarily be the same as those
which were pertinent in the original dispute.94
This decision makes it clear that, at least in Article 21.5 proceedings, the
jurisdiction of the panel may not be limited to the terms of reference of
the original panel. Perhaps if the United States had raised the issue of
lack of specificity and/or that the request for the Article 21.5 panel failed
to meet the jurisdictional requirements set out in Article 6.2 of the DSU,
the Panel might have decided differently. Given that the United States
was the responding party, and thus Malaysia, as the complaining party,
was arguing for this exception, the burden of proving that the terms of
reference were pleaded with sufficient specificity and that they com-
ported with the panel's original terms of reference should have been on
Malaysia." If that had been so, the United States' silence in this regard
would not have been damaging to its position.
Accordingly, one may be tempted to conclude from this decision that
panels do not interpret these issues to be exceptions using the standard
93. Id. at paras. 3.4, 5.9.
94. Id. at para. 5.8, quoting Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the
Export of Civil Aircraft-Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/AB/RW,
adopted Aug. 4, 2000, para. 41 [hereinafter Appellate Body, Canada-Aircraft (21.5)] (altera-
tions in original).
95. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 143 ("In the WTO, as in any mature
legal system, the party asserting a fact, whether claimant or respondent, is responsible for
providing proof of that fact.").
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rules of burden of proof or that the panel's original terms of reference are
not always so strictly confined, as India-Patents seemed to suggest.
96
More likely, however, is that the rules regarding the panel's original
terms of reference, and thus its jurisdiction, are simply different in Arti-
cle 21.5 proceedings than in ordinary proceedings. This notion is
supported by the United States-Shrimp case itself, which further states:
Indeed the utility of the review envisaged under Article 21.5 of
the DSU would be seriously undermined if a panel were re-
stricted to examining the new measure from the perspective of
the claims, arguments and factual circumstances that related to
the original measure, because an Article 21.5 panel would then
be unable to examine fully the "consistency with a covered
agreement of the measure taken to comply", as required by Arti-
cle 21.5 of the DSU.97
Finally, with regard to the establishment of the panel, a panel will be
established no later than the second meeting after the request for its es-
tablishment first appears on the DSB's agenda.98 Once a panel issues its
recommendations and rulings, the responding party has the right to ap-
peal the decision to the Appellate Body.99
1II. SCENARIOS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. Measures Withdrawn During the Course of Proceedings
Panels can still make rulings on withdrawn measures provided that
the measure is within the panel's terms of reference.'O While there is no
rule on this issue, many panels have decided to continue the adjudication
even after the measure is withdrawn, so long as the parties have not
agreed to the contrary.
In US-Wool Shirts, for example, the United States imposed a safe-
guard on imports of India's woven wool shirts and blouses which was to
96. There, the Appellate Body noted that "a claim must be included in the request for
establishment of a panel in order to come within a panel's terms of reference" and where it
stated that "[a]ll parties engaged in dispute settlement under the DSU must be fully forthcom-
ing from the very beginning both as to the claims involved in a dispute and as to the facts
relating to those claims." Appellate Body India-Patents, supra note 46, at paras. 89, 94.
97. United States-Shrimp, supra note 89, at para. 5.8 (quoting Appellate Body Canada-
Aircrafts (21.5), supra note 94, at para. 41).
98. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 105.
99. DSU, supra note 8, art. 17.4.
100. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at p. 26.
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become effective April 18, 1995 for a period of one year. '0' India re-
quested that the United States withdraw the measure, alleging particular
inconsistencies with the agreement at issue (the Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing).0 2 Before the Panel distributed its final report to the par-
ties, however, the safeguard measure was withdrawn.' 3 The Panel
nevertheless decided to adjudicate the case, stating that:
In the absence of an agreement between the parties to terminate
the proceedings, we think that it is appropriate to issue our final
report regarding the matter set out in the terms of reference of
this Panel in order to comply with our mandate ... notwith-
standing the withdrawal of the US restraint.' °4
The Panel further stated that this had been the practice of a number of
GATT panels in the past.
Similarly in India-Autos, India argued to the Panel that the licensing
regime, public notice, and trade balancing provisions in question had
been abolished after the request for the establishment of the panel.'06 The
Panel emphasized that the regulations in question were in existence at
the time of the establishment of the panel.' 7 It then stated:
A WTO Panel is generally competent to consider measures in
existence at the time of its establishment. This power is not nec-
essarily adversely affected simply because a measure under
review may have been subsequently removed or rendered less ef-
fective. Panels in the past have examined discontinued measures
where there was no agreement of the parties to discontinue the
proceedings.'O1
The Panel came to a similar conclusion in Chile-Price Band. The
Chilean government had imposed a provisional measure consisting of ad
valorem tariff surcharge which corresponded to the difference between
the general applied tariff added to the ad valorem equivalent of the spe-
cific duty determined by the price band system (PBS) and the bound
101. Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses from India, WT/DS33/R, adopted Jan. 6, 1997, para. 2.8 and para. 3 [hereinafter US-
Wool Shirts], upheld by, Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted Apr. 25, 1997 [herein-
after Appellate Body US-Wool Shirts].
102. Id. at para. 3.1.
103. Id. at para. 6.2.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Panel Report, India-Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R,
VT/DS175/R, adopted Dec. 21, 2001, para. 7.25. [hereinafter India-Autos].
107. Id. at para. 7.29.
108. Id. at para. 7.26.
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WTO tariff for these productsi 69 In other words, whenever the PBS duty,
in conjunction with the eight percent applied tariff rate exceeded the
31.5% bound rate, the portion of duty in excess of that bound rate was to
be considered to constitute the safeguard measure." ° Subsequently, de-
finitive safeguard measures which took the same form as the provisional
measures were imposed for one year on wheat, wheat flour, and edible
vegetable oils."' The safeguard measures were then extended." 2 During
the course of the proceedings, however, Chile withdrew the definitive
safeguard measures." 3
On the question as to whether to continue the adjudication of these
safeguards, Chile argued that since the provisional and definitive meas-
ures were no longer in effect on the date of Argentina's panel request,
the Panel did not have jurisdiction over the challenged measure." 4 The
Panel disagreed. It stated that while Article 19.1 DSU prevents panels
from making recommendations (i.e. suggesting appropriate remedies and
other action) on measures that are not currently in force, the Panel did
not believe that the same article prevented it from making findings re-
garding the consistency of an expired provisional safeguard measure, if
making such a finding would be necessary "to secure a positive solution
to the dispute.""5 It emphasized that it would not set forward recommen-
dations with regard to those expired measures."
6
The Appellate Body, in its recent ruling in US-Cotton Subsidies,
stated the point a bit differently. Here, it collapsed the distinction be-
tween recommendations and findings and instead made a distinction
delineating the types of recommendations WTO adjudicators can make
regarding expired measures."' It found that "the fact that a measure has
expired may affect what recommendation a panel may make. It is not,
however, dispositive of the preliminary question of whether a panel can
address claims in respect of that measure."" 8 Notwithstanding the subtle
difference with the Panel's statement in Chile-Price Band, the Appellate
Body emphasized that its ruling was consistent with the approach taken
by prior GATT and WTO panels on questions relating to the expiration
of measures after the initiation of dispute settlement proceedings. At
root, WTO adjudicators have decided similarly with regard to withdrawn
109. Chile-Price Band, supra note 29 at paras. 2.2, 2.3.
110. Id.
111. Id. at paras. 2.10-2.12.
112. Id. at para. 2.14.
113. Id. at para. 2.15.
114. Id. at para. 7.110.
115. Id. at para. 7.112.
116. Id.
117. Appellate Body US-Cotton Subsidies, supra note 52, at para. 272.
118. Id.
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or expired measures: "[i]n none of these cases has a panel or the Appel-
late Body premised its decision [whether or not to adjudicate a case or
an issue] on the view that, a priori, an expired measure could not be
within a panel's terms of reference."119
In addition, the Appellate Body in its review of the Panel decision in
Chile-Price Band, noted that if panels were not entitled to review ex-
pired measures, provisional safeguard measures would often escape
review by a WTO dispute settlement panel. °20 This same functional con-
cern would apply to any other measure that a country was relatively able
to repeal in the face of threatened action by another WTO member.
The cases above are an interesting insight into the panels' approach
to withdrawn measures. In US Wool Shirts and India-Autos for example,
the panels treated the option to continue adjudication as the default rule-
this is evident from the particular language utilized in the reports: "[iun
the absence of an agreement between the parties to terminate the pro-
ceedings .,' and "where there was no agreement of the parties to
discontinue the proceedings.' 22 These cases also highlight the impor-
tance of the parties' understanding or agreement on whether to continue
the adjudication, an important consideration in the panel's decision to
dismiss or continue forward in the adjudicatory process.
It may be argued that continuing adjudication of the dispute should
not be the default rule in light of judicial economy concerns. In particu-
lar, when a case involves the imposition of safeguards, precisely because
their temporary imposition is a legally accepted measure in the WTO
Agreements (so long as appropriately justified),23 the dispute should end
as soon as they are withdrawn, especially since a panel, pursuant to Arti-
cle 19.1 of the DSU, is quite limited regarding the recommendations, if
any, it can issue. 24 As the Panel in Chile-Price Band noted, however, a
decision to not adjudicate provisional safeguard cases would, in effect,
allow them to escape the scrutiny of WTO adjudicators as they can be
easily repealed. 2 , In this sense then, one can see the adjudication of
119. Id. at para. 272, n. 214.
120. Chile-Price Band, supra note 29, at para. 7.114.
121. US-Wool Shirts, supra note 101, at para. 6.2.
122. India-Autos, supra note 106, at para. 7.26.
123. See Agreement on Safeguards, in WTO Agreement, supra note 8, at 275 [hereinaf-
ter Safeguards Agreement].
124. See supra text accompanying note 29 (discussing Chile-Price Band) and note 117
(discussing Appellate Body US-Cotton Subsidies) on the adjudication of withdrawn or expired
measures. In addition, in Chile-Price Band, Chile argued that given that the measure at issue
had been withdrawn, "it is difficult to understand how, in terms of the purpose of the dispute
settlement system, there could be a more 'positive solution' to the dispute for Argentina... "
Chile-Price Band, supra note 29, at para. 7.4 (quoting Chile's Oral Statement at the second
meeting of the parties).
125. Id. at para. 7.114.
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withdrawn measures as a form of judicial economy because they make a
clear statement about the particular measure and, in doing so, provide
guidance to the legality of similar measures that may be enacted in the
future.'
26
It should be noted, however, that the above argument assumes either
that Members are able to know whether potential future measures are
similar enough to those found to be WTO-inconsistent or that Members
will be deterred from implementing measures of a similar quality, even if
they are unsure of their precise legality. If a Panel could not adjudicate
withdrawn measures, however, Members would still be better off taking
their chances by imposing provisional measures that might be WTO in-
consistent, and then simply repealing them if another Member challenged
them at the WTO. As the Panel emphasized in Chile-Price Band, this
would effectively allow such measures to escape Panel scrutiny. 27 There-
fore, such measures should be available for adjudication even after their
withdrawal.
B. Measure is Withdrawn but New Measure
Enacted Raises Similar Issues
Notwithstanding the above, WTO adjudicators have not always al-
lowed the continuation of the adjudication in the face of a withdrawn
measure. Argentina-Footwear and Textiles provides an example of a case
where a panel did not allow the adjudication of specific issues to con-
tinue.2 2 There, the United States argued that even though the new measure
imposed by Argentina was technically distinct from the one it replaced,
the effects of the new measure would have been identical to the withdrawn
one. 29 In particular, the United States challenged a series of specific duties
imposed by Argentina on the grounds that they violated rates bound under
Article II of the GATT. 30 Argentina revoked the measure that imposed the
126. For example, in Chile-Price Band, the Panel continued the adjudication of the
dispute and thus found the Chilean measures at issue to be WTO-inconsistent. Id. at para. 8.1.
Despite the fact that the measures at issue had already been withdrawn, this decision provides
guidance to Chile and other WTO Members, were they to would consider enacting similar or
identical measures in the future.
127.
We are concerned that if the conformity of such measures cannot, as a matter of
principle, be addressed by panels solely because they are no longer in effect ...
then provisional safeguard measures generally will escape panel scrutiny ....
Members could then adopt provisional safeguard measures, the WTO-inconsistency
of which, could never be examined by panels.
Id. at para. 7.114.
128. Argentina-Footwear and Textiles, supra note 20, at para. 6.13.
129. Id., at para. 6.9.
130. Id. at para. 3.1.
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specific duties after circulation of the request for the establishment of a
panel but before the panel was established by the DSB."3' On the day the
measure was revoked, however, Argentina re-imposed the same duties as a
provisional safeguard measure.132 Even though the same specific duties
were referred to in the terms of reference, the Panel declined to consider
the revoked measure, quoting the Appellate Body in US-Wool Shirts, not-
ing that the aim of the dispute settlement is not:
to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to "make law"
by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside
the context of resolving a particular dispute. A panel need only
address those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve
the matter in issue in the dispute."'
While at first glance this case may seem to be at odds with prior WTO
jurisprudence, it can be reconciled with the above cases and their concern
for judicial economy.'3 Here, Argentina revoked the measure before the
establishment of the Panel, that is, before the Panel began work on the
original matter at issue.' Accordingly, judicial economy concerns were
not significantly implicated. In fact, these concerns would have been exac-
erbated had the Panel continued with its original terms of reference-
terms which would have required it to analyze the complaint according to
different standards. A safeguard measure would have been challenged and
defended based on the Safeguards Agreement, a related but different
treaty; different grounds than a complaint alleging the imposition of duties
above bound rates in violation of Article II GATT. To have continued the
dispute with the original terms of reference would not allow Argentina to
defend its measure as it currently stood as a safeguards measure, unless
the Panel were to allow an amendment to the terms of reference. Such a
concept of amendment does not exist in the DSU. 3 6 Therefore, there
131. Id. at para. 3.4.
132. Id. at para. 6.5.
133. Id. at para. 6.13 (quoting the Appellate Body in Appellate Body US-Wool Shirts,
supra note 101, at 19).
134. See for example, US-Wool Shirts, Chile-Price Band, and Brazil-Aircraft, where
the panels decided to continue adjudication of the dispute in the case of withdrawn or changed
measures.
135. Argentina-Footwear and Textiles, supra note 20, paras. 3.4, 6.13.
136. Amendments do not exist in anyway akin to that in many domestic systems, such as
Rule 15 in the Federal Code of Civil Procedure of the United States. Rule 15(a) states, in rele-
vant part:
A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time be-
fore a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is on to which no responsive
pleading is permitted and action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the
party may so amend at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party
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would have been no possible way to allow the dispute to go forward on
different terms of reference.'
37
On the other hand, the Panel's acceptance and reliance on such a
technicality raises concerns regarding the panelists' method of interpre-
tation.3' How much weight should such technical concerns hold in light
of overarching public policy and judicial efficiency concerns? Are the
panelists and the Appellate Body properly equipped to make this deter-
mination? As Picciotto states, "[t]he AB's power to review the validity of
national regulations allows it in effect to overrule even laws enacted by
legislatures. This in turn raises the issue of accountability.... The le-
gitimacy of the adjudications is indeed crucial.'
139
Additionally, concerns of state opportunism are also raised. 140 It was
no doubt convenient for Argentina to make such a change in its legisla-
tion in an effort to avoid litigation and a potential adverse judgment.
While changes in domestic policy to avoid WTO disputes are usually
welcome (for example, where a Member takes preemptive, corrective
action to remedy the alleged free trade infraction), changes that maintain
the same trade-restrictive measure at issue with mere cosmetic altera-
tions are not actions that the DSB should encourage.
[The Appellate Body's] dilemma illustrates a more general dis-
advantage to the adoption of a mechanistic and closed approach
to the interpretation of legal provisions in international agree-
ments. An important merit of delegating the interpretation of
legal obligations on a case-by-case basis to an adjudicative body
is to introduce a necessary flexibility which allows incremental
adaptation. Otherwise, it has been pointed out that legalization
which takes the form of locking states in to detailed and rigid
may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.
Fed. R. Civ. P 15(a).
137. See DSU, supra note 8, art. 6.
138. See Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbes-
tos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R, adopted Sept. 18, 2000, (where the Panel accepted
Canada's argument that France was violating its WTO obligations by placing a ban on asbes-
tos containing products despite its obvious health risks; Robert Howse & Elisabeth Tuerk, The
WTO Impact on Internal Regulations-A Case Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute, in
THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (De Bdrca GrAinne & Joanne
Scott eds., 2001) (where the authors state that the Panel's approach to Canada's claim in the
EC Asbestos dispute resulted from its strict interpretative approach to the analysis under the
article at issue, leaving it no room to distinguish between legitimate domestic policy objec-
tives and protectionist motives of member States).
139. PICCIOTTO, supra note 21, at 6.
140. See Argentina-Footwear and Textiles, supra note 20, where the Panel allowed the
dismissal of the complaint despite the fact that Argentina only formally changed the label of
the measure at issue.
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obligations may have a range of negative effects, making it
harder to manage the social and political impact of trade agree-
ments, and facilitating mobilization by powerful domestic
lobbies to deter liberalization concessions, secure favourable
wording, and pressurize governments to insist on a strict appli-
cation. 1
41
Not only are these actions opportunistic and manipulative, they are
also a significant waste of judicial resources, both on the part of the DSB
(that mobilizes to undertake consideration of the complaint) and the re-
sponding Member country (that is likely to have spent time in
consultations and in general preparation for the dispute). In fact, the very
same rationale for not allowing amendments in the DSU provides sup-
port for disallowing Members to avoid adjudication on the basis of
merely technical or cosmetic changes. 4 2 Since many Member States are
at various times both complainants and respondents, it is not unrealistic
to assume that they would have an interest in prohibiting this practice for
fear of having it used against them.
This suggests that the DSU could include a provision allowing
amendments in cases where merely the name or some equally cosmetic
element of a measure has changed, but the effect on the complaining
party remains virtually the same.4 1 In these cases, because the complain-
ing party is the one that would benefit the most from maintaining the
dispute, and because it continues to be the party with the burden of proof
to state a claim, the burden to show that the substantial weight (if not all)
of the new measure's effects will be the same should remain on the com-
plaining Member.'"4 If the Member is not able to make such a showing,
then the panel should dispose of the dispute, just as it did in Argentina-
Footwear and Textiles. 45 This would ensure that responding parties do
141. PIcCIOTTO, supra note 21, at 15.
142. The rationale for not allowing amendments to terms of reference in the DSU is
often that given the inequality of Members' resources, skills and experience with the WTO
system it is reasonable to require a relatively early framing of the particular complaint in the
proceedings, an argument that also helps explain the requirement that requests for consulta-
tions and requests for the establishment of the panel be so similar. For example, the Appellate
Body has noted that it is important that a panel request be sufficiently precise.
[T]erms of reference fulfill an important due process objective-they give the par-
ties and third parties sufficient information concerning the claims at issue in the
dispute in order to allow them an opportunity to respond to the complainant's case.
Appellate Body India-Patents, supra note 46, at para. 87 (quoting
Appellate Body Brazil-Coconut, supra note 76, at 22).
143. See Argentina-Footwear and Textiles, supra note 20, at paras. 2.8 and 6.5.
144. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 143 (discussing burden of proof
within the GATT/WTO).
145. See Argentina-Footwear and Textiles, supra note 20, at para. 6.15.
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not take advantage of the WTO by efficiently repealing legislation that
will essentially be reenacted in another form, while also allowing for the
possibility that the responding Member is acting in a legitimate fashion.
C. Measure Remains in Effect but its Provisions Are no Longer
Applied to the Complaining Member
Contrast the cases above, in particular US-Wool Shirts, to the GATT
case of US-Tuna from Canada.146 In the latter, the complaining party,
Canada, had to convince the Panel to continue adjudication of the dis-
pute, even though the statute in question was never withdrawn.141 With
regard to judicial economy concerns, it would seem easier to make a
case for the continuation of the adjudication in this case than in US-
Wool Shirts, where continuing the proceedings was the default rule.
4
1
The dispute arose as a result of the United States' prohibition on imports
of tuna and tuna products from Canada.'49 This was a reaction to the sei-
zure of nineteen American fishing vessels and the arrest by Canadian
authorities of American fishermen for fishing in what Canada believed to
be its fisheries jurisdiction.5 An American statute provided that the Sec-
retary of State should take action to prohibit the importation of fish and
fish products from a foreign country when an American fishing vessel
was seized by a foreign nation as a consequence of a claim of jurisdic-
tion which was not recognized by the United States.' Thus, as the
United States did not recognize Canada's claim, it moved to prohibit
tuna imports from Canada.
5 2
Subsequently, the United States decided to lift the prohibition on
Canadian imports of tuna and tuna products and, in light of this, argued
that a panel decision was no longer needed.'53 Canada disagreed, arguing
that the possibility of further embargoes against Canada continued to
exist.'54 This threat would remain so long as the U.S. statute required the
imposition of import prohibitions on fish and fish products in response to
such actions by Canada.5 5 In addition, although the United States and
Canada had concluded an interim agreement that would ensure that the
Pacific Albacore tuna fishery, the matter at issue, would not be subject to
146. GATT Panel Report, United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Prod-
ucts from Canada, BISD 29S/91, adopted Feb. 22, 1982 [hereinafter United States-Tuna].
147. Id. at paras. 2.8, 2.9.
148. US-Wool Shirts, supra note 101, at para. 6.2.
149. United States-Tuna, supra note 146, at para. 2.3.
150. Id. at para. 2.1.
151. Id. at para. 2.2.
152. Id. at para. 2.3.
153. Id. at paras. 2.7, 2.8.
154. Id. at para. 2.8.
155. Id.
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the Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Canada stressed that this
treaty only laid the ground work for a long-term agreement which had
still to be negotiated and would require Congressional ratification.'56 As
such Canada argued, there remained a risk that the prohibitions on im-
ports could be imposed or even expanded to other products (salmon, for
example)."'
The Panel eventually agreed with Canada, despite the prevailing
GATT practice to confine panel reports to a brief description of the case
indicating the parties had come to a solution when a bilateral settlement
to a dispute had been reached."' It stated that "panels [have] on occasion
presented a complete report even if the measure giving rise to the dispute
had been disinvoked."'59 It noted in particular that in this case, Canada
did not accept that the results obtained bilaterally constituted a satisfac-
tory solution.'6° Although the Panel had to be "convinced" to continue
the adjudication, the fact that it did so suggests that adjudicators are will-
ing to consider the broader context in which the dispute arises and
Member country concerns beyond the conclusion of the dispute.16
1
D. Amendments to Measures During
the Course of Proceedings
A closely related issue concerns measures amended during the
course of proceedings. WTO jurisprudence suggests that amendments to
measures will be allowed when the wording of the panel request is broad
enough and when it is necessary in order to secure a positive solution to
a dispute.'62 In Chile-Price Band the Panel, in deciding to adjudicate the
amended measure stated that "where a measure included in the terms of
156. Id. at para. 3.22.
157. Id.
158. Id. at para. 4.3.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Such a continuation of the adjudication should be a default rule, or at least a pre-
sumption in favor of continuing the adjudication, particularly when the statute itself remains in
effect. See United States-Tuna, supra note 146, at paragraph 4.3 and Argentina-Footwear and
Textiles, supra note 20, at paragraphs 6.12-6.14, where the Panel discusses its considerations
in not continuing the adjudication of the dispute, in particular the fact that Argentina objected
and that there was no evidence of a clear threat of reoccurrence, as the United States was argu-
ing.
162. Please note that "amendments to measures" are distinct from "amendments to a
complaint" as mentioned in Part B above. Amendments to a complaint are not currently al-
lowed under the DSU. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted Sept. 9, 1997, para.
143 ("If a claim is not specified in the request for the establishment of a panel, then a faulty
request cannot be subsequently 'cured' by a complaining party's argumentation in its first
written submission to the panel or in any other submission or statement made later in the panel
proceeding.").
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reference was otherwise terminated or amended after the commencement
of the panel proceedings, panels have nevertheless made findings in re-
spect of such a measure.' 63
On appeal, the Appellate Body in the Chile-Price Band case con-
sidered whether the subject of the appeal was Chile's price band system
as amended or as it existed before the entry into force of the amend-
ment.'64Argentina's request referred to the price band system under Law
18.525 (the original law under which it was enacted) "as well as regula-
tions and complementary provisions and/or amendments."'65 Based on
this language, the Appellate Body stated that broad scope of the panel
request suggests that Argentina intended the request to cover the measure
even as amended.' 66 Therefore, it concluded that Law 19.772 (the new
law amending Law 18.525) fell within the Panel's terms of reference.
167
In addition, the Appellate Body stated that:
generally speaking, the demands of due process are such that a
complaining party should not have to adjust its pleadings
throughout the dispute settlement proceedings in order to deal
with a disputed measure as a "moving target." If the terms of ref-
erence in a dispute are broad enough to include amendments to a
measure-as they are in this case-and if it is necessary to con-
sider an amendment in order to secure a positive solution to the
dispute-as it is here-then it is appropriate to consider the
measure as amended in coming to a decision in a dispute.'68
The Appellate Body also expressed judicial economy concerns and
voiced its interest in securing a positive solution to the dispute. 69 To this
effect, it cited DSU Article 3.7 (stating that "the aim of the dispute set-
tlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to the dispute") and
Article 3.4 (providing that rulings should be aimed at "achieving a satis-
factory settlement of the matter"). 170 Finally, the Appellate Body
emphasized that that Argentina and Chile did not object to its considera-
tion of the price band system as amended. 7 ' The parties' agreement, or
163. Chile-Price Band, supra note 29, at para. 7.6 (quoting Indonesia-Autos, supra note
79, at para. 14.9.
164. Appellate Body Chile-Price Band, supra note 8, at para. 127.
165. Id. at para. 175.
166. Id. at para. 135.
167. Id.
168. Id. at para. 144.
169. Id. at paras. 140-43.
170. Id.
171. Id. at para. 143.
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lack thereof, to consideration of the measure as amended was also a
relevant factor under the GATT.1
7 2
In Brazil-Aircraft both the Panel and the Appellate Body demon-
strated their ability to focus on substance over form in deciding whether
an amended measure should continue to constitute part of their jurisdic-
tion.173 There the Appellate Body held, while affirming the ruling of the
Panel, that certain regulatory changes made to the measure after consul-
tations, but before the Panel was established, "did not change the
essence" of the measure being challenged and therefore were part of its
jurisdiction. 7 4 Brazil argued that certain regulatory instruments relating
to its aircraft financing program PROEX were not properly before the
Panel as those instruments came into effect after consultations were held
with Canada.' 75 Canada, however, argued that those instruments were
properly before the Panel because Canada's request for consultations and
its request for the establishment of a panel referred to the same matter. 
76
The Appellate Body found that the regulatory instruments that came into
effect after the consultations had taken place, and that related to the ad-
ministration of PROEX, did not change the essence of that regime, and
as such they were properly before it.
177
Similarly, in Chile-Price Band, while the amendment at issue had
been enacted after the panel was established, the Appellate Body stated
that this difference should not affect its approach in determining the
identity of the measure at issue since the amendment did not alter the
nature of the price brand system. Instead, the amendment simply clari-
fied the system by making "explicit that there is a cap on the amount of
the total tariff that can be applied under the system at the tariff rate of
31.5 per cent ad valorem... 1,7
In a more recent ruling, the Panel followed the Appellate Body's
lead in continuing the adjudication of an amended measure if the effect
of the measure remained the same. In Dominican Republic-Cigarettes,
the Dominican Republic had replaced the challenged measure and thus
172. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at p. 24. See also GATT Panel Report,
United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, BISD 36S/345, 383, adopted Nov. 7,
1989; GATE Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS33/1, June 10,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) (unadopted).
173. Appellate Body Brazil-Aircraft, supra note 31, at para. 132.
174. Id. at paras. 132 (referencing Brazil-Aircraft, supra note 31, at para. 7.11).
175. Id. at para. 127.
176. Id.
177. Id. at paras. 132-33.
178. Appellate Body Chile-Price Band, supra note 818, at para. 137.
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argued that it was no longer in force. 179 Honduras, the complainant, ar-
gued that what was relevant for the Panel's terms of reference was the
substance of the measure involved, not the legal acts in their original or
modified forms.8 In determining that the new law did not change the
essence of the initially challenged measure, the Panel referred to the pre-
vious panel decisions in Chile-Price Band and Brazil-Aircraft
examining measures amended either after the consultations or after the
establishment of the panel.' It therefore concluded that:
The Panel considers that in this dispute, the terms of reference
for this Panel refer to the transitional surcharge for economic
stabilization measure [the original measure challenged by Hon-
duras], which is essentially the same as the measure amended by
Law 2.04. The parties also explicitly agree that the amendment
by Law 2-04 does not change the essence of the surcharge. The
terms of reference of this Panel are broad enough to include the
new law .... The Panel therefore considers that the measure to
be examined is the transitional surcharge for economic stabiliza-
tion measure as provided by the new legal instrument Law
2 04 .182
The decisions above provide support for the idea that due process
concerns are often important factors in panel and Appellate Body deci-
sions, as adjudicators are concerned about providing sufficient
information to responding parties' so that they have an adequate oppor-
tunity to respond to the case.'83 The Chile-Price Band and Dominican
Republic-Cigarettes cases also makes it clear that WTO adjudicators
will give serious consideration to the broadness or specificity of the lan-
guage in the complaining Member's request when considering amended
provisions. This suggests that the parties' intent and understanding as to
what constitutes the dispute (i.e. notice) is a significant factor in the
WTO rulings." Furthermore, as the Brazil-Aircraft and the Dominican
Republic-Cigarettes cases illustrate, WTO adjudicators appear to give a
just amount of consideration to whether the essence of a measure has
been changed in determining its subject matter jurisdiction.'85 This posi-
179. Panel Report, Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the Importation and Inter-
nal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/R, adopted Nov. 26, 2004, para. 7.15 [hereinafter
Dominican Republic-Cigarettes].
180. Id. at para. 7.16.
181. Id. at para. 7.20.
182. Id. at para. 7.21.
183. See supra text accompanying note 76.
184. Appellate Body Chile-Price Band, supra note 18, at para. 135.
185. Appellate Body Brazil-Aircraft, supra note 31, at para. 127; Dominican Republic-
Cigarettes, supra note 179, at para. 7.21.
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tion is helpful in limiting the concerns with technicalities (i.e. a literal
analysis in the interpretation of the measures at issue) expressed in the
Argentina-Footwear and Textiles ruling discussed above.
E. Measures that Expired Before the
Request for Consultations
The fact that a measure has expired before the request for consulta-
tions does not prevent the Panel from considering the measure within its
jurisdiction. In US-Cotton Subsidies, the United States argued that par-
ticular payments made by the American government to farmers were not
within the Panel's terms of reference because they expired prior to Bra-
zil's request for consultations.'86 It emphasized that Brazil could not
dispute the expired legislation because Article 6.2 of the DSU requires
that the complaining party identify the "measures at issue" and, in the
view of the United States, if the measure had expired it could not be at
issue. 187
In response, the Panel first clarified that Brazil was not challenging
the legislation itself but only the subsidies and domestic support pro-
vided under the expired programs and authorizing legislation (i.e., the
actual payments)."' Accordingly, the only question before the Panel was
whether the payments were within its terms of reference. 89 In addition,
the Panel emphasized that Brazil was not seeking any recommendation
that the payments were to be brought into conformity with the Agree-
ment on Agriculture or GATT. 9° Instead, it noted that Brazil was only
requesting findings that those payments made during the 1999-2001
marketing years were not exempted from actions by Article 13 of the
same agreement and that they caused and continue to cause serious
prejudice to Brazil's interests in violation of the Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures Agreement and of the GATT.'9'
The Panel ultimately concluded that because the payments resulting
from the measures at issue (those being adjudicated) had already been
made at the date of the establishment of the Panel, they had not expired
but only been made in the past.192 In addition, regarding Article 6.2, the
Panel stated that this article does not address the issue of the actual
186. US-Cotton Subsidies, supra note 31, at para. 7.104.
187. Id. at para. 7.113.
188. Id. at para. 7.108.
189. Id.
190. Id. at para. 7.109.
191. Id.
192. Id. at para. 7.110 (noting that that this would be true of most subsidies challenged in
a claim of actual serious prejudice).
Spring 2005]
Michigan Journal of International Law
status of the measures (i.e., whether they are expired or in effect) but
instead focuses on whether the measures are "at issue.
' 193
In its recent decision, the Appellate Body confirmed the Panel's
analysis with regard to Article 6.2 and the expired measures.94 In par-
ticular, it stated that:
The relevant context for Article 6.2 in this regard includes Arti-
cles 3.3 and 4.2 of the DSU .... [T]hose provisions do not
preclude a Member from making representations with respect to
measures whose legislative basis has expired, if that Member
considers, with reason, that benefits accruing to it under the cov-
ered agreements are still being impaired by those measures. If
the effect of such measures remains in dispute following consul-
tations, the complaining party may, according to Article 4.7 of
the DSU, request the establishment of a panel, and the text of
Article 6.2 does not suggest that such measures could not be the
subject of a panel request as "specific measures at issue."'1 95
Given the nature of subsidies, this ruling could very well be limited
to similar instances where particular payments have been made, even if
the actual legislation has been repealed. 96 Indeed, this was confirmed by
the Appellate Body:
It is important to recognize the particular characteristics of sub-
sidies and the nature of Brazil's claims against the production
flexibility contract and the market loss assistance subsidy pay-
ments [these are the measures at issue]. Article 7.8 of the SCM
Agreement provides that, where it has been determined that "any
subsidy has resulted in adverse effects to the interests of another
Member", the subsidizing Member must "take appropriate steps
to remove the adverse effects or... withdraw the subsidy". (em-
phasis added) The use of the word "resulted" suggests that there
could be a time-lag between the payment of a subsidy and any
193. Id. at para. 7.121.
194. Appellate Body US-Cotton Subsidies, supra note 52, at para. 277.
195. Id. at para. 270.
196. US-Cotton Subsidies, supra note 31, at para. 7.110. The Panel explicitly acknowl-
edged the issue of the adjudication of expired measures in the context of subsidies:
We note that in any given moment in time some payments of subsidies have oc-
curred in the past while others have yet to occur in the future. If we were to
consider that past subsidies were not relevant to our serious prejudice analysis as
they were "expired measures" while future measures could not yet have actually
have caused actual serious prejudice, it is hard to imagine any situation where a
panel would be able to determine the existence of actual serious prejudice.
Id. (quoting Indonesia-Autos, supra note 79, at para. 14.206).
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consequential adverse effects. If expired measures underlying
past payments could not be challenged in WTO dispute settle-
ment proceedings, it would be difficult to seek a remedy for such
adverse effects .... Removal of adverse effects through actions
other than the withdrawal of a subsidy could not occur if the ex-
piration of a measure would automatically exclude it from a
panel's terms of reference.'97
It is interesting to note that due process concerns were not presented in
this case. The issue was not whether the measures were within the terms
of reference or the request for consultations--only that the measures
should not have been allowed in to begin with. 198 Accordingly, the United
States was aware of Brazil's claim from the start of the dispute and was
able to prepare itself for the adjudication of the measure's legality in
case the Panel (now affirmed by the Appellate Body) allowed it to be-
come part of its jurisdiction.' 99
F. Measures Not Included in Requests for Consultations
and/or Requests for the Establishment of the Panel
WTO jurisprudence has suggested that a panel may choose to adju-
dicate measures not included in a Member's request for consultations or
in the request for establishment of the panel if it is sufficiently related to
the measure at issue.200 For example, in Chile-Price Band the Panel al-
lowed a measure extending a previous measure's duration, which had not
been part of the requests for consultations nor for the establishment of a
panel,2°' to become part of its jurisdiction.202
Chile argued that the Panel could not examine this new measure be-
cause it was not included in Argentina's consultations request.0 3 The
Panel, in rejecting this argument, relied on the fact that the extension in
this case was not a distinct measure, but merely a continuation in time of
the definitive safeguards measures. 2° Therefore the definitive safeguard
measures were not terminated prior to Argentina's panel request and
were thus included in its request for consultations as Argentina had
197. Appellate Body US-Cotton Subsidies, supra note 52, at para. 273 (footnotes omit-
ted) (quoting Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in WTO Agreement,
supra note 8, at 229, art. 7.8 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]).
198. US-Cotton Subsidies, supra note 31, at para. 7.104.
199. Id.
200. The measure will be sufficiently related to the measure at issue when it does not
change the essence of the measure, emphasized by the Appellate Body in previous case law
discussed above. See, e.g., Brazil-Aircraft, supra note 31; Chile-Price Band, supra note 29.
201. Chile-Price Band, supra note 29, at paras. 7.111, 7.116.
202. Id. at para. 7.119.
203. Id. at para. 7.116.
204. Id. at para. 7.119.
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properly identified the definitive safeguard measures under Article 4.4.205
Further, because the extension of the measures did not alter the content
of the definitive safeguards measures and the extension was in fact dis-
cussed during consultations, even if the extension were to be considered
a separate measure, Chile's due process rights would not have been in-
fringed upon.206
A similar situation arose in US-Cotton Subsidies. There, the United
States argued that payments under programs unrelated to cotton were not
within the panel's terms of reference because they were not mentioned in
the request for consultations or in the request for the establishment of the•207
panel. Additionally, the United States submitted that Brazil's attempt to
raise the issue of these payments at the end of the proceeding worked to
deprive the United States of its due process rights.0 8 The Panel dis-
agreed.209 It noted that the payments in question were related to the
programs identified in the requests and that the request for the estab-
lishment of the panel did not limit the scope of the claims to those
programs unrelated to cotton. ° In reviewing Brazil's request, the Panel
stated that "[t]hese paragraphs contain no reference to payments on up-
land cotton base acres and there is nothing that would imply such a
limitation."
21 1
Regarding the United States' due process claim, the Panel noted that
the programs identified in the panel request, and those related to the
payments unrelated to cotton, had been central in the dispute since the
parties' first written submissions.212 In addition, both parties had ad-
dressed the issue of payments to non-upland cotton base acreage in their
prior responses to Panel questions and Brazil had raised this issue during
the first substantive meeting, to which the United States had re-
sponded.23 Therefore the Panel concluded that "this matter was not
raised at the very end of the proceedings and that the United States has
in fact responded to it.
214
205. Id.
206. Id. at para. 7.120.
207. US-Cotton Subsidies, supra note 32, at para. 7.129.
208. Id.
209. Id. at para. 7.132. These issues were not challenged on appeal, see Appellate Body
US-Cotton Subsidies, supra note 52.
210. US-Cotton Subsidies, supra note 31, at para. 7.132.
211. Id.
212. Id. at para. 7.134.
213. Id. at para. 7.135.
214. Id. at para. 7.136.
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G. Measures not yet Enacted at the Time of the Request
for the Establishment of the Panel
A panel may allow a specific measure that has not been included in
the consultation or panel request to be part of its jurisdiction when it is
appropriately related to the other measures at issue to not surprise the
responding party and thus deprive it of due process. A different result
may arise, however, when the measure is not mentioned in the panel re-
quest because it has not yet been enacted, even if the newly enacted
measure is sufficiently similar to the subject matter of the dispute.
In US-Cotton Subsidies, the Panel ruled that a measure enacted after
the request for the establishment would not constitute part of its jurisdic-
tion."1 5 In particular, the United States had requested the Panel to rule
that any measure under the Agricultural Assistance Act of 2003 was not
within its terms of reference because the measure was not consulted
upon nor enacted until after Brazil presented its request for the estab-
lishment of the panel.216 The Panel agreed with the United States.1 7 It
noted that the Agricultural Assistance Act of 2003 was enacted on Feb-
ruary 20, 2003, that Brazil submitted its request for the establishment of
the panel on February 6, 2003, and that the Panel was established on
March 18, 2003.28 The matter referred to by Brazil consisted of meas-
ures and claims set out in that document which was dated February 6,
2003 .219
The Panel concluded:
On that date, the Agricultural Assistance Act of 2003 did not ex-
ist, had never existed and might not subsequently have ever
come into existence. Brazil anticipated adoption of that Act in its
panel request and its claim in respect of that Act was entirely
speculative. Therefore, Brazil could not refer it to the DSB at
that time and it does not form part of the Panel's terms of refer-
220ence.
In support of its conclusion, the Panel stated that its ruling was consis-
tent with Article 3.3 of the DSU and therefore "the Agricultural
Assistance Act of 2003 could not possibly have been impairing any
215. Id. at para. 7.160. This ruling was not challenged on appeal. See Appellate Body
US-Cotton Subsidies, supra note 52.
216. US-Cotton Subsidies, supra note 31, at para. 7.155 (citing the United States' sub-
missions).
217. Id. at para. 7.160.
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benefits at the date of Brazil's referral of its complaint to the DSB be-
cause it did not yet exist.
2
1
This is a welcome decision by the Panel. Hypothetical or yet to be
enacted measures should not constitute part of a panel's jurisdiction as
this would be inconsistent with Article 3.3 of the DSU. Further, it is also
in conflict with Article 6.2, which requires requests for the establishment
of the panel to indicate the specific measures at issue. 2 In particular,
regarding measures that have not yet been enacted, there is simply no
measure at issue to begin with. In addition, judicial economy concerns
might also be presented as measures that have not yet been enacted
might never be enacted in the first place. To adjudicate on the basis of
hypothetical scenarios may unnecessarily waste DSU resources. Hypo-
thetical measures are distinct from withdrawn or amended measures in
that they do not and nor have ever existed. As such, they have never pre-
sented an issue for any WTO adjudicator and to actually adjudicate on
this basis would be extremely speculative and wasteful.
Finally, state sovereignty concerns may also be implicated by the ad-
judication of yet un-enacted or hypothetical measures. WTO Members
have agreed to settle matters according to the DSU when laws and regu-
lations are actually affecting other Member countries. They have not
agreed, however, to permit the DSU to examine hypothetical measures or
those still being debated in their legislatures. In fact, this is recognized
by Article 3.2 of the DSU which states:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element
in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trad-
ing system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the
rights and obligations of Members under the covered agree-
ments, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB
cannot add or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the
223covered agreements.
221. Id. at para. 7.160. In addition, Article 3.3 of the DSU reads:
The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any benefits
accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being im-
paired by measures taken by another Member is essential to the effective
functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights
and obligations of Members.
DSU, supra note 8, art. 3.3.
222. Id. art. 6.2.
223. Id. art. 3.2.
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It is true that States also have not agreed to be bound to DSU pro-
ceedings with regard to withdrawn measures. States have, however,
agreed to be bound to the DSU when measures are in existence, and at
the time of the commencement of the proceedings, unlike hypothetical
measures, withdrawn measure existed and, in fact, raised serious con-
cerns to the complaining Member. Accordingly, adjudication of
withdrawn measures is more akin to the continuation of the adjudication
of an existing measure than consideration of a non existent (or as yet un-
enacted) measure. The former, and not the latter, as discussed above, is a
well established practice in the WTO.
In the following section the possibility of providing advisory juris-
diction to the Appellate Body will be discussed. Permitting such
jurisdiction would allow the Appellate Body to provide a legal opinion
regarding hypothetical measures without actually issuing a binding rul-
ing against a particular Member. This would most likely avoid the
problems discussed above, such as judicial economy and state sover-
eignty concerns, as the issuance of legal opinions would not require a
full-fledged panel adjudication and the ruling would have no legal effect
on any Member State.
IV. ADVISORY JURISDICTION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Judicial economy, state opportunism, and due process concerns need
to be well-balanced in the dispute settlement body. While panels and the
Appellate Body should always strive to exercise judicial economy when
the rights of parties are not affected, in cases of withdrawn or amended
measures, they should complete the adjudication of the dispute if the
complaining party so requests and issue a finding as opposed to a rec-
ommendation.'2 This suggestion may at first glance seem superfluous,
but it could prevent future disputes involving the same measure were the
responding country to implement it again. The threat of state opportun-
ism, as well as the need for certainty with regard to the outcome of WTO
litigation, cautions against giving judicial economy concerns too much
224. A recommendation would no longer be needed at any rate. See, e.g., DSU, supra
note 8, art. 19.1; Appellate Body US-Cotton Subsidies, supra note 52, at para. 272; Chile-
Price Band, supra note 29, at para. 7.112. DSU Article 19.1 states in part that a recommenda-
tion is issued "[wihere a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent
with a covered agreement" and accordingly that it shall be recommended that "the Member
concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement." DSU, supra note 8, art.
19.1. In contrast, a finding is only the adjudicator's basis for the recommendation; the latter of
which is essentially a ruling prescribing action on the part of the member State.
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weight in such situations. 25 Finally, when measures are amended during
the course of proceedings, panels should pay extra attention to the result-
226ing due process concerns. By and large however, it seems as if due
process concerns have been given fair consideration in DSB proceed-
ings.
The DSB should, however, give greater attention to judicial econ-
221omy and state opportunism concerns. One potential way of doing so
and a proposal for future reform would be to provide the Appellate Body
with advisory jurisdiction to review questions of law and hypothetical
measures. With regard to questions of law, the Appellate Body would be
available to provide opinions to questions posed by Member States aris-
ing under the covered agreements. In the case of hypothetical measures,
the Appellate Body would issue an opinion with regards to the legality of
the hypothetical measure, as if it were enacted by a member government.
Indeed, no actual action would be taken against any Member State.
If and when such a measure (or a substantially related one) were in
fact enacted, the Appellate Body's findings and/or recommendations
would be highly persuasive. These advisory findings would not binding;
the complaining Member would still have to bring a case to the DSB
through the usual procedures established in the DSU. The flexibility of
the panels to adjudicate the case in a manner not bound by the Appellate
Body would be particularly important in cases where the responding
party had in fact taken the Appellate Body's previous recommendations
into account and on that basis had changed particular aspects of the same
measure to conform to its ruling.
Both powers could potentially resolve some of the issues faced by
the DSB.2 28 By conferring to the Appellate Body the power to provide
answers to questions of law raised under the WTO Agreements, the cer-
tainty and predictability of the dispute settlement system would be
229enhanced. Member countries would have a better sense of the meaning
225. State opportunism concerns have been expressed by WTO adjudicators, see the
Appellate Body Report Chile-Price Band, supra note 29, at paragraph 144. With regard to the
stability issue, see DSU Article 3.2, which provides that the dispute settlement system is cen-
tral to providing security and predictability to the trading system, DSU, supra note 8, art. 3.2.
226. Both panels and the Appellate Body have in fact done so. See, e.g., supra discussion
in note 29.
227. See United States-Tuna, supra note 146, at paragraphs 2.8-2.9, where continuing
the adjudication of the dispute was not the default rule, and Argentina-Textiles and Footwear,
supra note 20, at paragraphs 2.8 and 6.5, on the state opportunism issue, as well as the discus-
sion in sections 111(b) and (d) above.
228. These issues include judicial economy, state opportunism and due process dis-
cussed in section III of this paper and in WTO case law, see supra notes 13, 18, and 29.
229. The certainty and predictability of the system is an ongoing concern for the WTO.
See for example, the Appellate Body's recent decision in United States-Corrosion-Resistant
Carbon Steel, where it stated that:
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of particular provisions and their likely interpretation by WTO adjudica-
tors. 2' This provides greater opportunities for judicial economy, the
benefits of which would outweigh the potential costs of this proposed
advisory function. The more informed Member States are regarding the
interpretation of WTO law, the more confident they would be in predict-
ing the outcome of WTO disputes." Accordingly, they might be less
willing to incur the costs of adjudication, particularly if a would-be
complaining Member perceived it was likely to lose.232 Even in cases
where a Member was confident of success, there would be greater incen-
tives to settle or resolve the dispute through consultations: more accurate
estimations regarding the chances of success would provide a better in-
dicator to those involved of what an appropriate settlement would be.233
Furthermore, providing the Appellate Body with advisory jurisdic-
234
tion might also help avoid the problem of state opportunism. Member
States might be less willing to enact and withdraw measures strategically
if they had a better sense of the likely interpretation of particular agree-
ments by the Appellate Body. The same would be true regarding
hypothetical measures. This knowledge, combined with the awareness
that DSB proceedings against the violating Member would be highly
likely given that other Members would know the probable outcome of
any future dispute (and thus their likelihood of success on the claim),
would be a major barrier to the strategic enactment and withdrawal of
measures.
Some Member countries have proposed a similar role for the WTO
General Council, as opposed to the Appellate Body. For example,
the disciplines of the GATE and the WTO, as well as the dispute settlement system,
are intended to protect not only existing trade but also the security and predictabil-
ity needed to conduct future trade .... Thus, allowing claims against measures, as
such, serves the purpose of preventing future disputes by allowing the root of WTO-
inconsistent behaviour to be eliminated.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-
Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products From Japan, VT/DS244/AB/R, adopted Dec. 15, 2003,
para. 82.
230. See Dispute Settlement Body Special Session, Jordan's Contributions to the Im-
provement of the DSU, TN/DS/W/43 (Jan. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Jordanian Proposal].
231. This might be particularly advantageous for poorer countries that have fewer re-
sources to bring disputes in the first place.
232. See Mark J. Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement
Amounts and Verdict Rates, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 263-90 (1989), where the authors argue that the
relatively low litigation rates in Japan can be explained by the fact that individuals are more
likely to settle since they know what the results will be in court; the certainty with regard to
the outcome of the litigation makes going to trial useless.
233. Id.
234. See supra discussion in note 18.
Spring 2005]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Jordan's recent proposal suggests the addition of a new Article 5 in the
DSU entitled "Questions of Interpretation." 231 It states, in part, that:
1. Parties and third parties to a dispute may at any stage of the
proceedings refer questions of interpretation to the General
Council in accordance with this Article.
2. Question(s) shall be laid before the General Council by means
of a written request containing an exact statement of the que-
ries upon which the interpretation is requested, accompanied
by all documents likely to assist in addressing and answering
the question(s).236
With regard to advisory jurisdiction per se, Jordan proposes that the
Appellate Body or the DSB be granted the power to seek advisory opin-
ions from the International Court of Justice,237 as opposed to giving WTO
Member States the authority to seek advisory opinions from the Appellate
Body, as suggested above. Jordan proposes that these advisory opinions
would "be considered as an instrument of interpretation that aims at assist-
ing the relevant bodies in recommending or adopting a report on a certain
dispute., 238 Importantly, these proposals reflect the necessity of greater
guidance with regard to the interpretation of WTO Agreements.239
While there appear to be no specific proposals on preventing the stra-
tegic withdrawal of or amendments to measures during the course of the
proceedings, Member countries have expressed concern with regard to the
enactment of measures with similar effects as those previously adjudi-
cated. For example, Brazil's proposal to the DSB suggests the addition of
a new article following Article 20 of the DSU entitled "Procedures Related
to Measures Already Held Inconsistent with the Covered Agreements. 2 °
It would in read, in part:
1. A Member may request the establishment of a panel by the
DSB under an expedited procedure whenever its rights are be-
ing nullified or impaired by the same Member taking a
measure that has already been found to be inconsistent with a
covered agreement by an adopted report. The panel shall be es-
tablished at the same DSB meeting where it first appears on the
235. Jordanian Proposal, supra note 230, at paras. 39-42.
236. Id. at para. 42.
237. Id. at para. 40.
238. Id. at para. 41.
239. See, e.g., supra discussion in note 25 (considering the issues surrounding the inter-
pretation of the WTO Agreements).
240. Dispute Settlement Body Special Session, Contribution of Brazil to the Improve-
ment of the DSU, TN/DS/W/45/Rev.1 (Mar. 4, 2003), para. 6.
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agenda, unless the parties agree otherwise. Prior consultations
are not required.
2. This panel shall be composed, whenever possible, by the same
panelists having served in the panel that has already ruled on
the measure at issue. In any case, the panel shall be composed
within [10] days of the establishment of the panel.
5. If the panel finds that the measure at issue is different from the
measure previously declared WTO inconsistent, the expedited
procedure is terminated, and the complaining party may start
panel procedures provided in Article 4 et seq of this Under-
standing.
6. If the panel finds that the measure at issue is the same as the
measure previously declared WTO inconsistent, a hearing shall
be held within [x] days in order for the parties to present their
oral arguments related to the facts concerning the measure at
issue. 4'
This article would have the effect of accelerating the DSB proceedings
when Members enact measures that present the same issues as measures
previously found to be WTO-inconsistent. While the suggestion presented
in this Note, that of continuing the adjudication of withdrawn or amended
measures would not eliminate all cases of newly enacted measures with
the same effect as previous ones, it may limit them.242 The responding
member would have an explicit panel or Appellate Body ruling with
regard to the previous measure at issue and if the ruling were in its favor, it
would be less willing to risk another round of proceedings by the
(victorious) complaining Member. Providing the Appellate Body with
advisory jurisdiction over hypothetical measures would most likely have
the same, if not greater, effect given that the Appellate Body would have
effectively issued an opinion (though unenforceable) with regard to a
newly enacted measure.2 43
241. Id. (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original).
242. See United States-Tuna, supra note 146, paragraph 3.27, where Canada argued that
not continuing the adjudication of the dispute, despite the fact that a treaty was concluded with
the United States on this particular matter and thus solved the issue at hand, would result in
the continuance of a threat to Canada, as the measure at issue had not been withdrawn. There-
fore, Canada wanted an explicit ruling on the measure at issue by the GATT Panel, even if it
no longer affected Canada.
243. The European Union proposes that a panel be dismantled if a complaining party
withdraws its request for the establishment of the panel at any time before the panel issues its
final report:
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Japan's proposal to the DSU raises similar considerations. In particu-
lar, it relates to the prevention or repeated application of WTO-
inconsistent measures under discretionary law. Japan proposes the addition
of a new footnote to the first paragraph of Article 19, which would state:
When the panel or the Appellate Body finds that it is likely that
such a inconsistent measure will be repeatedly taken based upon
an administrative discretion provided by laws or regulations of the
Member concerned, it shall recommend that the Member con-
cerned take action necessary to ensure that such a discretion not
be exercised in a manner inconsistent with its obligations under
the covered agreements.'
While Japan's proposal is limited to situations involving discretionary
laws (i.e., those that are not mandatory and thus are not immediately chal-
lengeable as such under WTO law), the purpose of its proposal is to
prevent Members from repealing measures under mandatory laws that
have been found to be violations of WTO laws and enacting the same
measures under discretionary law.24'5 The proposal provides that when a
panel or the Appellate Body considers the repetition of the same violation
to be highly probable, it may recommend that the Member concerned take
A request for the establishment of a panel may be withdrawn at any point in time by
the complaining party before the issuance of the final report. If the request is with-
drawn, the authority for the establishment of the panel shall lapse.
European Proposal, supra note 11, at 9. While providing the complaining party with this au-
thority is less harmful than providing it to the respondent party, it still has its costs. In
particular, it could still disadvantage the respondent. The latter may have an interest in receiv-
ing a recommendation or finding with regard to the measure at issue so that it can have some
closure with regards to the adjudication and both some knowledge and certainty with regards
to the inconsistency (or lack thereof) of the originally contested measure. Given that the re-
sponding Member has also invested the time and resources into the settlement of the dispute, it
would seem only fair that if it so desired, it should be entitled to an opinion by the adjudica-
tors.
244. Dispute Settlement Body Special Session, Amendment of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, TN/DS/W/32 (Jan. 22, 2003),
para. 22, page 11 [hereinafter Japanese Proposal].
245. Id. at 2. With regard the mandatory/discretionary legislation, it is a long-standing
principle in the GATT and WTO dispute settlement that if a complainant alleges that a law is
WTO inconsistent, the complainant must show that the law by its terms mandates official
conduct and that there is no possibility for officials to exercise their discretion to apply the law
in a manner that avoids any violation. See Panel Report, United States-Measures Treating
Exports Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R, adopted June 29, 2001 at paras. 8.126-8.132;
Appellate Body Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted
Aug. 28, 2000 at paras. 88-89; Appellate Body Report, Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998, WT/DSI76/ABIR, adopted Jan. 2, 2002 at para. 269.
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necessary steps to prevent the repetition of WTO-inconsistent measures
under the discretionary law. 6
While the proposed amendments above reflect both an awareness and
concern on the part of member States of the some of the issues addressed
above, they fail to directly address the concerns highlighted in this Note;
namely, those relating to judicial economy, due process and state oppor-
tunism that are likely to arise when the withdrawal of or amendment to
measures at issue during the course of proceedings are left unchecked by
WTO adjudicators.
CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to shed light on the withdrawal of and
amendments to challenged measures during the course of proceedings, an
aspect of the dispute settlement proceedings that, to date, has not been
given sufficient attention. If left unchecked, such actions by Member
States could threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the DSB, an increas-
ingly important dispute settlement body for the international community.
As the Appellate Body's recent affirmation of the Panel's ruling in the US-
Cotton Subsidies case illustrates, the DSB is an important and influential
vehicle for both rich and poor countries as it permits all Member States to
successfully challenge potential trade infractions covered under the WTO
Agreements. In the case of agricultural subsidies, in particular, this is no
small feat as the DSB's impact on developing countries' economies has
the potential to be quite significant.
2 7
With regard to the particular issues addressed in this Note, while the
panels and the Appellate Body appear to give fair consideration to due
process, WTO Members would benefit from greater attention to judicial
economy and state opportunism, issues some Member States are attempt-
ing to address in the context of DSU reform, as evidenced from the
proposals in the preceding section. Such an effort is particularly timely as
the WTO completes its first ten years of successful operation. To continue
on this path, the dispute settlement body needs to further cement its repu-
tation as a fair and transparent institution, a reputation that could be at risk
if concerns about procedure, as well as other aspects of its operation, are
not addressed in the near future.
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., OXFAM, WHO WILL BE LEFT TO CHEER THE END OF ILLEGAL US COT-
TON SUBSIDIES? (Oxfam Briefing Note, 2005).
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